The Vice Presidency in South Sudan — A Structural Design Bound to Fail

Policy Brief: The Vice Presidency in South Sudan — A Structural Design Bound to Fail

Executive Summary

This briefing presents SSFDA’s analysis of the structural flaws embedded within South Sudan’s current power-sharing arrangement, particularly the appointment of the opposition leader as Vice President under a militarized and highly centralized presidency. Contrary to its framing as a step toward unity and national healing, the arrangement has functioned, in practice, as a mechanism of containment and political neutralization — not genuine governance reform.

We call upon development partners, diplomatic actors, and guarantors of the peace process to re-evaluate the assumption that symbolic inclusivity equates to meaningful power-sharing. We invite you to join us at the table to explore more viable alternatives grounded in federalism, institutional accountability, and citizen-centered governance.

1. Context and Structural Flaws

Since the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement, the political design of South Sudan’s transitional government has been framed as a unity government, balancing powers between the ruling SPLM-IG and opposition SPLA-IO. In this model, the opposition leader assumed the role of First Vice President.

However, this position lacks operational autonomy:

• The Vice President has no independent budget, no separate command of security forces, and operates in a space heavily surveilled by state intelligence services.

• Ministerial portfolios assigned to the opposition have remained largely under-resourced or undermined by parallel executive authority.

• Most significantly, NSS (National Security Service) continues to operate with impunity, reportedly detaining political actors without trial and targeting grassroots opposition.

Rather than power-sharing, this has become a system of symbolic integration and practical exclusion.

2. Consequences of a Dysfunctional Arrangement

The consequences of this flawed arrangement have been profound:

• The opposition has been delegitimized through association with a regime that continues to commit serious human rights abuses.

• Institutional paralysis and fear-based governance have persisted, reinforced by NSS operations including arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearances.

• The public, particularly youth and displaced communities, perceive the current structure as a betrayal of the promises of independence and reform.

The Vice President — though a central figure in the peace agreement — has been reduced to a ceremonial role, with limited capacity to influence policy or protect his constituency, many of whom remain at risk of ethnic targeting and displacement.

3. International Stakeholders: Reassessing Assumptions

Donor institutions and diplomatic facilitators have, with good intent, promoted political inclusivity as a stabilizing force. However, inclusivity without agency undermines both credibility and results.

The SSFDA respectfully urges the international community to:

• Reassess the utility of enforced co-governance models in contexts where trust, equity, and institutional integrity are absent.

• Shift focus toward structural reform and decentralization, rather than symbolic appointments.

• Support locally grounded federal models that empower regions, protect minorities, and create genuine space for opposition voices without coercion.

4. A Call to Engage: Toward a Viable Alternative

The SSFDA is actively developing a federal roadmap for South Sudan’s recovery. This includes:

• A draft Constitution grounded in equity and inclusion.

• A governance framework that separates powers and decentralizes executive control.

• A proposed civilian-led transitional structure with guaranteed protections for dissent, human rights, and independent civil institutions.

We do not present these proposals as dogma, but as an invitation to think beyond the failed models of the past decade. We welcome collaboration, dialogue, and critical engagement from development partners, civil society organizations, and regional guarantors.

Conclusion

South Sudan cannot be stabilized through arrangements that prioritize optics over substance. As the failures of the current model become increasingly apparent, there is both urgency and opportunity to design a future that is structurally sound, representative, and resilient.

We invite you to engage with SSFDA in shaping that future — together.

For further information, partnership proposals, or participation in upcoming stakeholder dialogues, please contact:
SSFDA Communications Office
Email: pressoffice@ssfda.org